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This paper provides the first systematic attempt to investigate the legislative impact of the Scottish Parliament 
on Executive legislation by analysing the fate of all amendments to Executive bills from the Parliament’s first 
session (1999-2003). Initial findings on the success of bill amendments show that the balance of power inclines 
strongly in favour of ministers. However, when we account for type of amendment and initial authorship we find 
evidence that the Parliament (both coalition and opposition MSPs) actually makes more of an impact, 
particularly in terms of the level of success of substantive amendments to Executive bills. Findings have 
implications for much of the current literature that is sceptical of the existence of power sharing between the 
Executive and the Parliament and within the Parliament. 
 
Much has been written about the campaign and establishment of the Parliament (Mitchell, 1996; Taylor, 1999), 
the mechanics of how the Parliament works in theory (Hassan, 1999; McFadden and Lazarowicz, 2000; Lynch 
2001), and legitimation and representation issues (Shephard et al., 2001). However, beyond anecdotal evidence
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and beyond the study of MSP perceptions (Arter 2002a; Scottish Council Foundation, 2002; Arter 2004), we do 
not have any systematic indicators of the extent to which the Parliament is having an impact on Executive 
legislation. This is a particular drawback in Scotland; given that devolution was heralded as an opportunity to 
deliver a 'new politics' that would be different from the 'old politics' of Westminster. One of the features of this 
'new politics' is the sharing of power between the Executive and the Parliament. 
 
New Politics, Power Sharing and Balance of Power 
What is 'new politics'? 'New politics' is a rather vague concept (Mitchell, 2000, p. 605) that has been variously 
deployed and defined. Deployment of the term 'new politics' in the Scottish context originates in the rhetoric and 
expectations of the home rule movement. While several aspects of the new Scottish Parliament were based on 
the workings of Scandinavian parliaments (see Arter, 2002b), it is understandable that much of the comparisons 
of 'old' and 'new' were with Westminster. For example, the search for 'consensus' was borne out of a frustration 
with Westminster adversarial politics and the focus on strong and non-partisan committees was based on the 
shortcomings of a charged political atmosphere with plenary sessions rather than committees as the main driver. 
Setting out the demands for a Scottish Parliament, for example, the Labour-led Scottish Constitutional 
Convention (SCC) hoped that: 
 
…the coming of a Scottish Parliament will usher in a way of politics that is radically different from the rituals of 
Westminster: more participative, more creative, less needlessly confrontational (SCC, 1995). 
 
These wishes were largely incorporated into the 1997 White Paper, Scotland’s Parliament, following the 
election of Labour earlier that year. Reporting on the rules of procedure and Standing Orders of the Parliament, 
the Consultative Steering Group (CSG) recommended four underlying principles: power sharing; accountability; 
equal opportunities; and openness and participation.  
 
These four principles are illustrative of the features characterising a 'new politics', but scope, and hence 
definitions, vary. James Mitchell identifies three core aspects of new politics rhetoric: new institutions, new 
processes and a new political culture (2000, p. 605). He argues that while new institutions have been realised, 
and new policy-making processes have been partly realised, the new political culture has largely failed to 
materialise. Consequently, Mitchell argues that expectations of Parliament’s policy-making position vis-à-vis 
the Executive have been oversold (Mitchell, 2000, p. 606). 
 
Much of the evidence from MSPs to date shows a similar dissatisfaction with the practice of 'new politics' (see 
Scottish Council Foundation, 2002). MSP concerns have ranged from the low quality of debates and a lack of 
focus and organisation, to high degrees of party influence and control (for example, over committee voting and 
selection of convenor) and concerns over Executive control over Bills and the parliamentary timetable (SCF, 
2002). More recently, a 2003 Procedures Committee report on the founding principles of the Parliament warns 
strongly against the Parliament becoming a ‘conveyor belt for passing legislation’ to the detriment of quality 
scrutiny and influence (Procedures Committee, 2003, paragraph 1016). Of the 135 recommendations advocated 
to improve the practice of the four principles, nearly half related to recommendations designed to improve the 
'power sharing' principle: 
 
Power sharing was designed to be the key to creating a new model of governance in Scotland, 
synthesising traditional representative democracy with elements of a more participative model, and, 
while we have made recommendations in relation to all four CSG principles, our conclusions suggest 
that it is in relation to power sharing that most progress remains to be made (Procedures Committee, 
2003, paragraph 1003). 
 
Adopting a wide view of power sharing, David Arter (2004) defines 'new politics' as a trilateral sharing of 
power between the Executive, Parliament and People. Arter also identifies additional features of power sharing 
in his analysis, namely power sharing within the Executive and power sharing within the Parliament (to which 
might logically be added power sharing within society). He argues that evidence of 'new politics' is most likely 
to be found by analysing the defining new feature of the Scottish Parliament, the committee system, and 
legislative output of the Parliament as a whole. However, Arter's analysis of the committee system is a 'brief 
inventory' that touches on the big picture of committee activities and successes to date. Measures include the 
number of committee bills enacted, number of inquiries conducted, number of petitions considered, number of 
committee meetings held outside the Parliament, and committee incumbency levels. 
 
Arter finds evidence of power sharing between Parliament and the Scottish people that does have policy-making 
consequences (albeit constrained by the prevalence of partisanship). He also argues that the CSG envisaged 
power sharing between the Executive and outside organisations. However, power sharing between the Executive 
and the Parliament proved more complex. While parliamentary influence is demonstrated by the allocation of 
competencies to committees and the right to initiate legislation, the CSG envisaged a system in which the 
Executive were still able to ‘govern’ - suggesting effective parliamentary scrutiny and influence of the 
Executive rather than power sharing per se. 
 
Most of the commentary on Parliament's successes has focused on the Member and Committee Bills that have 
been enacted (see for example, Shephard 2001-2003; Arter 2004). Leaving aside the well-trodden analysis of 
areas where the Parliament can initiate its own legislation, we focus our analysis on Parliament's reaction to and 
successes in influencing Executive legislation. Whereas Arter uses interview examples with MSPs to support his 
argument that government-opposition relations have been similar to those in the House of Commons, we 
analyse the fate of every amendment to Executive Bills to more closely examine the nature of this relationship. 
If Arter is right about the nature of the balance of power we would expect to find that the balance inclines 
strongly in favour of ministers and parliamentarians from the coalition parties. While it may still be too early to 
pass judgement, we do at least have one full session
ii
 of parliamentary data on which to make an assessment in 
terms of amendments to Executive Bills. 
 
Analysis of amendments is not the only test that could be used but it is a key indicator of parliamentary 
influence that has been largely neglected in British analyses since Griffith's (1974) study of the Westminster 
Parliament. By contrast, the comparative European literature has made more use of this kind of analysis (see for 
example, Tsebelis 2001; Kreppel 2002). The comparative European literature is also instructive in that it 
provides a comparative context within which the Scottish Parliament can be assessed. 
 
The Scottish Parliament and the Comparative European Context 
Initial evaluations of convergence/ divergence in Holyrood and Westminster bills (see Keating et al., 2003) 
shows that devolution has not provided an institutional revolution on the scale of that witnessed in the emerging 
parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe (see for example, Olson and Norton, 1996; Arter, 2002b). Dramatic 
change in Scotland is undermined for a number of reasons, including the blurred boundaries between reserved 
and devolved matters, the UK’s single market and welfare state, common UK security issues, the UK’s position 
within the EU, party and ministerial links, civil service uniformity and the prevalence of Sewel motions (see 
Keating, 2005; Cairney and Keating, forthcoming). Western European comparisons are arguably more 





So what should we expect of Western European legislatures? In Polsby’s (1975, in Norton, 1998) terms, while 
the US legislature is 'highly transformative', West European legislatures range from 'modified transformative' 
(Holland and Sweden), to 'modified arena' (Germany, Italy, UK) and 'arena' (Belgium and France). Norton’s 
(1998) more recent rankings of the policy effect has Italy, Holland and Scandinavian parliaments as the most 
influential, Germany, Belgium and the UK in the middle, with Ireland and France as the least influential. But 
where does Scotland fit in? 
 
Arter’s (2002b) qualified argument is that Scotland has a Scandinavian-style assembly, with (unlike 
Westminster) a strong committee system at its core. Further, in Mattson and Strøm’s (2004, p. 100-1) terms, 
these committees compare very favourably with those in other Western European systems in terms of the 
indicators of committee strength. However, as Arter (2002b) recognises, there is no current need for the leading 
party coalition (of Labour and Liberal Democrats) to engage in power sharing with opposition parties (such as 
the Scottish National Party and the Conservative Party). Therefore, as Mitchell (2000) argues, if the political 
culture of power sharing is largely absent then party cohesion and coalition dominance may undermine the 
effectiveness of these new resources. 
 
If we accept that the leading party coalition has no need to share power with the opposition parties then in terms 
of the success of legislative amendments we could hypothesise that: 
 
 Virtually all ministerial amendments would succeed 
 Virtually all opposition amendments would not succeed 
 Amendments from Labour and Liberal parliamentarians will be more successful than amendments 
from opposition parliamentarians. 
 
And if we accept that political culture/party cohesion ensures that the Scottish Parliament is more of a reactive 
than a policy making body then we could further expect that: 
 
 Most ministerial amendments would be contested. 
 The whip system at both stages of amendments would ensure that the Executive wins each vote on 
contested amendments. 
 
Analysing Legislative Amendments: Lessons from the European Parliament and 
Westminster 
Unlike roll call analyses, amendment analyses for other countries are scarce. The most recent and detailed 
analyses of amendments come from studies of the European Parliament (EP). While not directly comparable 
(EP analyses focus on the relative salience of the different legislative procedures in operation) limitations of 
amendments analyses are discussed in this literature and are of use in guiding our analysis: 
 
 It is difficult to determine the motives of the proposer from the amendment itself. In other words, an 
amendment may be proposed for inclusion, or proposed to highlight the proposer’s beliefs on an issue 
(Earnshaw and Judge, 1996; Tsebelis et al., 2001; and Maurer, 2003). 
 Amendments do not fully define interests – for example, the wishes of the European Parliament may 
already be addressed by the Council’s first draft (Tsebelis et al., 2001, p. 576). 
 The counting of amendment success does not take the substance of the amendments into account 
(Maurer, 2003, p. 242). This point is partially resolved by Kreppel’s (2002) categories of textual, 
domain and policy amendments. 
 Analysis of success rates does not take into account the number of points that are taken up and 
reintroduced by different actors (Maurer, 2003, p. 242). 
 
On this basis, Maurer (2003) rejects a focus on parliamentary amendments and instead employs a textual 
analysis, comparing the initial drafts proposed by the Council with the redrafted text following European 
Parliament amendments (see also Selck and Steunenberg, 2004 for an interests-based analysis). This approach is 
fruitful, and a change of the substance of bills following the legislative process may be a good indicator of 
legislative impact in this context. However, in the Scottish Parliament this may be of limited value without an 
analysis of the amendment process itself, since in Scotland (as in Westminster) it is the Executive that pursues 
most of the changes to that text. We argue that Maurer underestimates the value of detailed amendments 
analysis, particularly if criticisms on substance and initial authorship can be addressed. 
 
Problems one and two (see above) deal with the issue of masked motives and similar interests respectively. In 
the case of masked motives, we acknowledge that there are likely to be numerous motives in the lodging of 
amendments. For instance, some may be designed to release ideological tensions or to reflect constituency 
concerns. To the extent that not all amendments are designed to influence the Executive then we should 
acknowledge that analyses of amendment successes in terms of legislative policy influence are likely to 
overestimate 'failures', and so underestimate the balance of power that the Parliament has with the Executive. 
 
In the case of similar interests, parliamentary influence can be masked by Executive pre-emption (either on 
purpose or inadvertently). Again, because of this, we are likely to underestimate the balance of power that the 
Parliament has with the Executive. Tsebelis et al. (2001) regard similar interests more as an opportunity than a 
constraint per se. They argue that if, say, the Council is aware of the European Parliament’s position, then it can 
incorporate this into its first draft. That way, amendments are only necessary when the two institutions do not 
agree. If this is the case, then amendments analysis focuses on disagreement that is important in any assessment 
of power dynamics. 
 
Addressing the issue of substance, Kreppel (2002) devises three main categories: first, an amendment that 
merely clarifies the text of the bill; second, one which extends the applicability or domain of the text; and third, 
one which adds a significant policy dimension. While acknowledging the subjective nature of assigning 
amendments to these categories, Kreppel's analysis is limited by the lack of reliability testing. To tackle problem 
(3), we follow Kreppel in assigning differences in the quality of amendments. However, as we discuss below, 
we supplement substantive analysis with inter and intra-coder reliability measures to test the consistency of this 
value-based application. 
 
Finally, we attempt to address the problem of initial authorship by measuring the extent to which MSPs 
withdraw their amendments in return for assurances by ministers that the spirit of the amendments will be 
reintroduced at a later stage in the process. By only measuring ministerial assurances and their realisation, we 
acknowledge that we are likely to miss those instances that are not mentioned in committee debates. 
Consequently, our findings are likely to underestimate the legislative impact of the Scottish Parliament. 
 
When Griffith studied the impact of the House of Commons on the legislative process across three sessions he 
measured the annual number and proportion of amendments that were agreed to, withdrawn or 'negatived' by 
Ministers, Government backbenchers, and opposition members. In total, he found that whereas 99.9 per cent of 
Minister amendments were agreed to, success was around ten per cent for Government backbenchers and less 
than five per cent for opposition members (Griffith, 1974, pp. 195-207). Moreover, in three sessions he could 
only find evidence of nine non-ministerial substantive amendments that were agreed to (Griffith, 1974, p. 202). 
 
However, as some of the more recent literature discussed above illustrates, we need to be aware of the nuances 
of the legislative process. While the Executive might move an amendment, it might also owe its origin to the 
non-Executive. Consequently, while we replicate Griffith’s quantitative analysis by assessing success of 
amendments by Executive, Executive backbenchers, and non-Executive backbenchers, we develop the Griffith 
framework to examine more systematically the salience of initial authorship and qualitative differences in the 
types of amendment moved. 
 
In terms of the qualitative differences in the types of amendments moved, the Westminster literature suggests 
that most ministerial amendments will be concerned with the fine-tuning of legislation. Judge (1993, pp. 110-
111) argues that Parliament devolves much decision-making responsibility to ministers and their departments 
and it expects any introduced bill to be a 'draft Act'
iv
. Fine-tuning entails correcting typographical errors and 
adding clarity and detail. Consequently, we hypothesise that: 
 
 Virtually all ministerial amendments will correct typographical errors, make ‘consequential’v changes, 
or relate to the detail and clarity of the bill, because it is the job of the Executive to make the bill work 
at each stage. The Executive presents the Bill as a draft Act and fine details are negotiated during the 
parliamentary process. 
 
Therefore a ‘face-value’ analysis of amendment success will exaggerate the importance of ministerial 
amendments because it treats all amendments as equally substantive. 
 
 A majority of ministerial amendments will be passed without controversy (because the Executive 
anticipates parliamentary reaction and the amendments are not controversial). 
 By the last stage of the legislative process we would expect to see most substantive MSP concerns to 
have been considered and re-addressed by the Executive in the minister’s name. This process also 
accounts for much of the non-Executive ‘failure’ of amendments, since many non-Executive 
amendments are withdrawn following ministerial assurance that the issue will be addressed at a later 
stage in the legislative process. 
 
Amendment Types 
Following systematic exploration and triangulation with the transcripts of all of the relevant Official Reports of 
parliamentary and committee proceedings we develop three broad categories of amendment types: 
typographical/consequential; detail/clarification; and substantive. Unlike the Kreppel (2002) analysis, our first 
category (typographical/consequential) distinguishes amendments that merely correct spelling and grammatical 
mistakes (typographical) as well as repetitive follow-through amendments that ensure bill consistency 
(consequential). Our second category (detail/clarification) is similar to Kreppel’s first. It describes amendments 
that clarify meaning and emphasis without changing the tone of the bill, or amendments that add detail to 
existing provisions. Finally, a substantive amendment (like Kreppel’s 'policy' category) alters the substance or 
tone of the bill (but within the context of the bill itself – that is, it cannot be a 'wrecking amendment' in the 
judgement of the committee convenor or Presiding Officer). 
 
Both the categories and the coding of amendments are grounded in the amendment deliberations of the 
committees and Parliament as a whole (all data available from the Scottish Parliament web site
vi
). In addition to 
this we track and note the parliamentary origins
vii
 of amendments across the legislative stages. We also analyse 
the success of those amendments by group that went to a vote, and we disaggregate unsuccessful amendments to 
gain more insight into ‘failure’. Having explored the transcripts for the first ten Executive Bills, we devised a 
coding manual of amendment categories (labelled according to both the type of amendment and its fate) that 
included instructions and examples of each dimension measured. One trained individual conducted all coding to 
avoid problems of internal reliability that arise from inter-observer inconsistencies in coding practices. 
However, to address the issue of external reliability (can the findings be replicated by somebody else?) a second 
trained individual ‘blindly’ coded a sampleviii of the amendments and the extent of agreement was measured 
using Cohen’s Kappa (k) coefficient.ix Intra-coder reliability (can the findings be replicated by the same coder?) 
was also addressed as the first coder was subject to a ‘blind’ coding reassessment of a sample of the 
amendments and the extent of consistency was again measured using Cohen’s Kappa. 
 
Data 
At the end of its first full session (1999-2003), the Scottish Parliament had passed 62 Bills (50 Executive, eight 
Member, three Committee and one Private). This paper investigates the nature of the balance of power between 
the Executive and the Parliament by analysing success of amendments and success by amendment type for the 
50 Executive bills passed by the Parliament. The total number of amendments analysed was 9081 across 44 
Executive bills (six of the 50 Executive bills were passed without amendment). 
 
Results 
The face-value figures of amendment numbers and success rates by author moved (see Table 1) shows that 
ministers move the most amendments and are nearly always successful. Across the 44 bills, ministers moved a 
total of 5725 amendments, or 63% of the total. If we also add the amendments from the Labour and Liberal 
backbenchers this figure raises to 73%. Of the ministerial amendments, 5690 (99 per cent) were successful and 
only 35 (less than one per cent) were not successful
x
. This compares with the non-Executive, where out of a 
total of 3356 amendments moved, only 415 (12 per cent) were successful and 2941 (88 per cent) were 
unsuccessful. Therefore, ministers account for 5690 (93%) of the 6105 successful amendments. The degree of 
success for ministers is remarkably similar to the ministerial success that Griffith found in his 1967-71 study of 
House of Commons. The only difference is that the non-Executive fares a little better in the Scottish Parliament 
than they did in the House of Commons. Whereas amendments by Government backbenchers had around a one 
in ten success rate in the House of Commons, we find that amendments by backbenchers from the Executive 
parties have more than a one in five success rate. Similarly, whereas less than five per cent of opposition 
member amendments were found to be successful in the House of Commons, the corresponding figure of 
success for opposition members in the Scottish Parliament is higher at nine per cent. Among the opposition, 
while the Scottish National Party (SNP) were the most active in moving amendments, the Conservatives had a 




Success of Amendments in the Scottish Parliament 
             
Moved by   Moved  Successful  Unsuccessful 
    N  N %  N % 
             
 
Executive (a)   5725  5690  99.4    35   0.6 
 (Lab)   (3499)  (3488) (99.7)  ( 11) ( 0.3) 
 (Lib Dem)  (2226)  (2202) (98.9)  ( 24) ( 1.1) 
Non-Executive (b)  3356  415  12.4  2941  87.6 
(Lab/Lib Dem Total) (888)  (191) (21.5)  (697) (78.5) 
 (Lab)  (527)  (119) (22.6)  (408) (77.4) 
 (Lib Dem) (361)  ( 72) (19.9)  (289) (81.1) 
(Opposition Total) (2468)  (224) ( 9.1)  (2244) (90.9) 
(SNP)  (1457)  (128) ( 8.8)  (1329) (91.2) 
(Con)  (791)  ( 91) (11.5)  (700) (88.5) 
(Other)  (220)  (  5) ( 2.3)  (215) (97.7) 
 
Total (a + b)   9081  6105  67.2  2976  32.8 
             
Data includes all amendments (N = 9081) for the 50 Executive bills passed by the Scottish Parliament 1999-
2003 (six of which passed without amendment). K = +0.98** (inter-coder test) and +1.0** (intra-coder test). ** 






Success of Amendments that went to a Vote in the Scottish Parliament 
             
Moved by   Vote  Successful  Unsuccessful 
    N  N %  N % 
             
 
Executive (a)   184  181  98.4    3   1.6 
(Lab)   ( 87)  ( 84) (99.6)  ( 3) ( 3.4) 
 (Lib Dem)  ( 97)  ( 97) (100)  ( 0) ( 0.0) 
Non-Executive (b)  1004   87  8.7  917  91.3 
(Lab/Lib Dem Total) (154)  ( 40) (26.0)  (114) (74.0) 
 (Lab)  ( 61)  ( 18) (29.5)  ( 43) (70.5) 
 (Lib Dem) ( 93)  ( 22) (23.7)  ( 71) (76.3) 
(Opposition Total) (850)  ( 47) (5.5)  (803) (94.5) 
(SNP)  (478)  ( 19) ( 4.0)  (459) (96.0) 
(Con)  (253)  ( 26) (10.3)  (227) (89.7) 
(Other)  (119)  (  2) ( 1.7)  (117) (98.3) 
 
Total (a + b)   1188  268  22.6  920  77.4 
             
Data includes all amendments that went to vote (N = 1188) from the 50 Executive bills passed by the Scottish 
Parliament 1999-2003. K = +0.98** (inter-coder test) and +1.0** (intra-coder test). ** p < .001. For 
amendments of more than one author, disaggregation by party is based on the lead author’s party. 
 
Thirteen per cent (N = 1188) of all amendments were forced to a vote (see Table 2). However, this figure masks 
much variation between the Executive and non-Executive. Whereas only three per cent of ministerial 
amendments are pushed to a vote, the figure is approximately one in three for non-Executive amendments, and 
more than one in two if we narrow our focus to exclude the four main parties. Where an amendment went to a 
vote we find that ministers were successful in 98 per cent of cases while the non-Executive were only successful 
in less than nine per cent of cases (see Table 2). When we disaggregate the proportion of non-Executive 
amendments that went to a vote we find that Labour/Liberal Democrat amendments were more than four times 
more likely to be successful (26 per cent) than opposition amendments (less than six per cent). Not only is 
success during votes largely the preserve of ministers, it is also far more likely among the Labour/Liberal non-
Executive coalition than it is the opposition. The most successful opposition party during votes is the 
Conservative Party (albeit with a paltry one in ten success rate).  
 
Our findings in Tables 1 and 2 support most of our initial hypotheses. Virtually all ministerial amendments are 
successful, virtually all opposition amendments are not, and the amendments from Labour and Liberal 
parliamentarians are more successful than those of the opposition. However, while we find that ministers 
succeed in nearly all of their contested amendments, we do not find that most ministerial amendments are 
contested. Rather, we find the opposite - less than four per cent are contested. This finding can be interpreted in 
two different ways. First, the opposition may be reluctant to challenge ministerial amendments because of the 
futility of the exercise. The coalition parties have majorities on the committees and so can block opposition 
challenges. Alternatively, this finding might indicate that the vast majority of ministerial amendments actually 
meet with committee approval - suggesting a spirit of consensus among the parties. While both interpretations 
have their examples, we argue that the consensus explanation holds most sway since the futility argument fails 
to explain why, in comparison, over a third of all opposition amendments are forced to a vote. Our explanation 
is strengthened when we consider the type of amendments being moved. 
 
As Kreppel (2002) illustrates, analyses of amendment successes fail to distinguish among amendment types. To 








A Qualitative Assessment of Successful Amendment Types 
by Author in the Scottish Parliament 
             
   Typographical/ Detail/   Substantive 
Author    Consequential  Clarification     
 
    N %  N %  N % 
             
 
Executive (a)   3363  59.1  2108  37.0  219   3.8 
(Lab)   (2074) (59.5)  (1281) (36.7)  (133) ( 3.8) 
 (Lib Dem)  (1289) (58.5)  ( 827) (37.6)  ( 86) ( 3.9) 
Non-Executive (b)  189  45.5  195  47.0    31   7.5 
(Lab/Lib Dem Total) ( 64) (33.5)  (102) (53.4)  ( 25) (13.1) 
 (Lab)  ( 27) (22.7)  ( 71) (59.7)  ( 21) (17.6) 
 (Lib Dem) ( 37) (51.4)  ( 31) (43.1)  (  4) ( 5.6) 
(Opposition Total) (125) (55.8)  (93) (41.5)  (  6) ( 2.7) 
(SNP)  ( 64) (50.0)  ( 61) (47.7)  (  3) ( 2.3) 
(Con)  ( 60) (65.9)  ( 28) (30.8)  (  3) ( 3.3) 
(Other)  (  1) (20.0)  (  4) ( 1.7)  (  0) ( 0.0) 
 
Total (a + b)   3552  58.2  2303  37.7  250   4.1 
             
Data includes all successful amendments (N = 6105) for the 50 Executive bills passed by the Scottish 
Parliament 1999-2003. K = +0.68** (inter-coder test) and +0.77** (intra-coder test). ** p < .001. For 




Typographical/Consequential = amendments that correct spelling and grammatical mistakes/repetitive follow-
through amendments to ensure bill consistency. 
Detail/Clarification = amendments that provide necessary detail to complement existing substance/ amendments 
that clarify meaning and emphasis. 
Substantive = amendments that alter the existing substance or tone of the bill. 
Table 3 shows the number and proportion of amendments that were successful by amendment type and by 
author. It shows that only four per cent of successful ministerial amendments made substantive changes while 
96 per cent related to typos, consequential amendments, details or clarifications. By contrast, eight per cent of 
the non-Executive successes were substantive. These findings confirm our qualitative hypothesis that virtually 
all of the ministerial amendments would relate to fine-tuning of the draft legislation, and help explain why the 
majority of ministerial amendments are passed without controversy. Consequently, analysis by quality (and not 
just quantity) suggests a more interesting picture in which the vast majority of successful amendments deal with 
corrections and policy minutiae. Interpreted from this perspective, qualified data suggests that the Parliament is 
not as imbalanced vis-à-vis the Executive as figures of raw success indicated. 
 
However, when we disaggregate the non-Executive amendments we find that the opposition have fared less well 
than the non- Executive Labour/ Liberal Democrat coalition (only six successful and substantive amendments 
compared with 24). Further disaggregation by party reveals that the Labour MSPs have been more successful 
with substantive amendments than the rest of the MSPs combined. Moreover, if we compare ministerial and 
non-Executive Labour/ Liberal Democrat substantive success with that of the opposition parties we find that the 
opposition parties account for less than one in 40 substantive successes. While accounting for amendment type 
does qualify the nature of ministerial successes, we still find that just as 93 per cent of all successful 
amendments come from ministers, so ministers author 88 per cent of all successful ‘substantive’ amendments.  
 
However, we need to investigate this further. Like Maurer (2003) we argue that ‘authorship’ is rather more 
complex than it appears. Indeed, when we explored the committee transcripts we found that many of the 
successful substantive ‘Executive’ amendments were actually earlier non-Executive amendments that had been 
withdrawn typically on the proviso that the Executive would find the necessary legal jargon for the amended bill 
to make sense. Therefore we should ask the following:  
 
 Of the substantive amendments relating to ministerial ‘success’, how many of these actually re-addressed 
earlier concerns (for example, Stage 2 amendments) of backbench MSPs? And, 
 If we account for initial authorship, then to what extent does this make a difference to our understanding of 
the degree of power sharing between the Parliament and the Executive?  
 
Ministers are usually very open and candid about the initial authorship of amendments. This is especially the 
case with MSPs (both coalition and opposition) where promises to look into amendments in exchange for their 
withdrawal at early stages are common. 
Table 4: 
A Qualitative Assessment of Successful Amendment Types 
by Original Author in the Scottish Parliament 
             
Original     Detail/   Substantive 
Author      Clarification 
 
      N %  N % 
             
 
Executive     1915  83.2  157  62.8 
 
Non-Executive      388  16.8    93  37.2 
(Non-Executive Inspired)   (193)  (8.4)  (62) (24.8) 
(Non-Executive Presented)   (195)  (8.4)  (31) (12.4) 
 
Total      2303  100  250   100 
             
Data includes all successful clarification, detail and substantive amendments (N = 2542) for the 50 Executive 
bills passed by the Scottish Parliament 1999-2003. There is no breakdown by party because ministers often 
attribute authorship to committees rather than individual MSPs. 
 
 
Table 4 illustrates that, even if we take initial authorship into consideration, ministers still account for over 80 
per cent of the successful amendments relating to clarification and detail. However, this is no surprise since 
Parliament expects ministers to address these issues. As Judge (1993) argues, Parliament devolves this 
responsibility to ministers. More significantly, our figures suggest that of the 250 successful substantive 
ministerial amendments, 62 (25 per cent) were found to have addressed concerns initially raised by backbench 
MSPs. To reflect this, adjusted calculations show that while 157 (63 per cent) successful substantive 
amendments can be attributed to ministers, 93 (37 per cent) of the successful substantive amendments can be 
attributed to backbenchers. In other words, successful substantive amendments can be attributed to 
backbenchers in at least one out of three cases.  
 
By taking into account origin of amendment within the parliamentary arena, we find evidence that backbenchers 
are relatively more influential than face-value data suggests. Moreover, we also find that this process does not 
suggest major party/ coalition bias. In fact, the opposite is marginally the case. We argue that this is because 
most ministers tend to support Labour MSPs in directly amending bills, whereas with opposition MSPs they 
prefer to offer a new amendment at a subsequent stage in exchange for a withdrawal. In most cases the effect is 
the same, since Labour MSPs initially withdraw, accept revisions by the Executive, then reintroduce 
amendments under their own name. 
 
More importantly, we also find significant evidence of the role of committees in this process. Of the 62 non-
Executive 'inspired' substantive amendments, we find that approximately two-thirds are attributed
xii
 to initial 
committee (rather than individual MSP) concerns. This initial concern usually comes from the committee in 
charge of Stage 2 of the relevant bill. However, the Subordinate Legislation Committee also plays a significant 
role in the constant reassertion of parliamentary process. Specifically, most bills contain general provisions 
stating that ministers may order statutory instruments or produce guidance in furtherance of the bill, after its 
completion. However, the committee tends to act to qualify this power by insisting on the requirement of 
parliamentary resolutions to accompany secondary legislation. In other words, it attempts to ensure that 
statutory instruments are subject to committee scrutiny and approval. 
 
Our findings demonstrate a significant parliamentary role in the passage of substantive amendments which is not 
dominated by the majority party/coalition. Further, they allow us to reinterpret the apparently high levels of non-
Executive ‘failure’. 
 
Our analysis of committee reports and minutes reveal that most MSP amendments are not necessarily put 
forward to be accepted into the text of the bill. Disaggregating the number of non-Executive amendments that 
are unsuccessful (N = 2941) reveals that 1636 (56 per cent) were withdrawn, 1219 (41 per cent) were rejected 
by vote (including those amendments that were consequential to those rejected), and 87 (three per cent) were 
superseded (where one amendment negates the applicability of another). While the coalition is much more 




Withdrawn amendments fall into three broad categories. First are those amendments designed to elicit debate or 
Executive response. Of these there are two main types. ‘Holding’ amendments are introduced to ensure that 
significant debate is secured for the issue. 'Probing’ amendments are designed to enquire about the status quo 
and/or Executive intentions. The main point about these types of withdrawn amendments is that they are not 
really ‘unsuccessful’, since MSPs often do not intend these to be accepted per se. As an example, during the 
Stage 2 consideration of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Bill, SNP MSP Michael Matheson tabled an 
amendment designed to probe the minister on the status and remit of statutory exemptions to the disclosure of 
information. 
 
Second are those amendments that become unnecessary to pursue during the legislative process. Again, there are 
two main types. First, the Executive may explain why the amendment would not work or why the wording 
would be difficult to implement. As an example, during the Stage 2 consideration of the National Parks 
(Scotland) Bill, Liberal Democrat MSP John Munro tabled an amendment that sought to ensure that local 
interests would be 'fully' considered and 'positively engaged' during the preparation of national park proposals. 
Having received ministerial assurance that his wording could thwart progress on national park development and 
that statutory guidance on the incorporation of local interests was forthcoming, Munro withdrew his 
amendment. Second, MSPs often present amendment alternatives because they are unsure of their fate. For 
example, they may present one strong and one compromise amendment on the same subject. This is well 
demonstrated by Conservative MSP Murray Tosh’s successxiv in removing sections 51-60 (regarding workplace 
parking licensing schemes) of the Transport Bill. This substantial success caused Tosh to withdraw 15 
amendments that became unnecessary. 
Table 5: 
Disaggregation of Unsuccessful Non-Executive Amendments 
             
           Rejection by Vote Withdrawn  Superseded 
Author            (+ Consequential)  
   
    N %  N %  N % 
             
 
Non-Executive   1218  41.4  1636  55.6   87   3.0 
 (Lab/Lib Dem Total) (131) (18.8)  (545) (78.2)  ( 21) ( 3.0) 
 (Lab)  ( 53) (13.0)  (339) (83.1)  ( 16) ( 3.9) 
 (Lib Dem) ( 78) (27.0)  (206) (71.3)  (  5) ( 1.7) 
(Opposition Total) (1087) (48.4)  (1091) (48.6)  ( 66) ( 2.9) 
(SNP)  (624) (47.0)  (661) (49.7)  ( 44) ( 3.3) 
(Con)  (312) (44.6)  (379) (54.1)  (  9) ( 1.3) 
(Other)  (151) (70.2)  ( 51) (23.7)  ( 13) ( 6.0) 
             
Data includes all non-Executive unsuccessful amendments (N = 2941) for the 50 Executive bills passed by the 
Scottish Parliament 1999-2003. 
 
Finally there are amendments that are addressed by the Executive. Of these, there are four main types. First, 
sometimes two amendments are similar and one is withdrawn in favour of the other (or is superseded). Indeed, 
the Executive often replicates MSP amendments at the same stage of debate to ensure that the non-Executive 
point is acknowledged in a form that is acceptable to the Executive. This is well exemplified by the debate on 
fuel policy within the Housing (Scotland) Bill. Several MSPs presented amendments to deal with this issue, but 
deferred to the minister when they were satisfied with the wording and detail. Second, ministers state that if the 
MSP withdraws the amendment at this stage then the Executive will address the issue and amend at a later stage. 
Again, the point is that non-success does not necessarily equate with ‘failure’, since the substance of the 
amendment is accepted and reshaped by the Executive. This is well illustrated in the Stage 3 debate of the Water 
Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Bill when SNP MSP Fiona McLeod stated that ‘the SNP and the 
committee must acknowledge the consideration that the Executive has shown in listening to what we have 
said’.xv Of course, this is not to suggest that the Executive always accept the points word-for-word. Rather, it 
typically addresses a broad concern or follows a broad aim raised by the non-Executive. The ‘spirit’ of the 
amendment or the commitment to solve a problem is maintained even if the wording is not
xvi
. Third, some 
amendments withdrawn at Stage 2 are reintroduced at Stage 3 if the MSP does not feel that her/ his amendment 
has been fully addressed by the Executive. Fourth, some amendments are withdrawn at Stage 2 and reintroduced 
by MSPs at Stage 3 following Executive help with redrafting. 
 
Therefore, the large proportion of withdrawals, coupled with the significant number of MSP-based substantial 
Executive successes, shows a process that is more open to power sharing or consensus than the face-value 
figures suggest. This furthers the argument that the legislative process, when disaggregated and qualified, shows 
rather more evidence of complex power relations existing between the Executive and the Parliament. 
 
Conclusion and Implications 
In this paper we have analysed the extent to which the Scottish Parliament makes a difference to Executive 
legislation during the amendments process. While we find that the Executive dominates in the success of 
amendments, there is evidence of greater balance between the Executive and the Parliament (including the 
opposition) when we control for amendment type and initial authorship. The willingness of MSPs to withdraw 
amendments, coupled with the mainly sincere (and demonstrated) ministerial commitment to address MSP 
concerns, results in a combined success that the face-value figures do not illustrate. Our qualified findings 
indicate that the balance of power between the Executive and the Parliament and within the Parliament is not as 
Executive and coalition-party centric as it initially appears. 
 
Our findings have interesting implications for those who study the impact of parliaments. Clearly our 
investigation of the Scottish Parliament suggests that the operation of the UK Parliament demands closer 
inspection than that afforded by Griffith (1974). However, our conclusions also provide a challenge for 
comparative European analysis. Such accounts need to go beyond a focus on the institutional set-up of Western 
European countries or analyses at the bill, rather than amendment, level. Individual country-level analyses of the 
detailed amendments process are required to ascertain the generalisability of our findings. 
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i
 Hassan and Warhurst, 2000; Hazell et al, 2000, 2003; Lynch, 2001; Shephard, 2001-2004; Trench et al, 2001, 
2004; Watson, 2001; and Winetrobe 2001. 
ii
 In the Scottish Parliament ‘session’ refers to a full term between elections. In Westminster it refers to one year. 
iii
 We therefore leave a discussion of the role of committee and member bills to another paper. 
iv
 See Jordan (1990). The 'draft Act' does not undermine the parliamentary process. On the contrary, our analysis 
of the Scottish Parliament suggests that MSPs are likely to protest more if the bill is not drafted well enough. As 
in Westminster, poor drafting of bills as introduced leads to a raft of ministerial amendments which may change 
the substance of the bill and allow Parliament less time to scrutinise legislation (see Griffith, 1974: p.88). 
v
 Consequential amendments are follow-through amendments that are needed if a prior amendment to a bill is to 
make any sense. For instance, an amendment that removes a word from a bill may require that five subsequent 
mentions of that word are also removed from that bill. Clearly, while the first amendment may alter the 
substance of the bill, it would be disingenuous to count the five consequential amendments that it triggered as 




 Although the original source for many of the amendments moved is often extra-parliamentary (in particular 
from interest groups), we are interested in identifying the MSP or MSPs who first move(s) an amendment in the 
parliamentary arena. 
viii
 Our reliability sub-sample includes over 10% (933 out of 9081 amendments) of cases and exceeds sampling 
guidelines for an N of this size (see discussion of current methods literature in Neuendorf 2002, pp.158-59). The 
                                                                                                                                                        
nature of our data (especially the need to identify consequential amendments) and the demands of our measures 
(especially the need to control for initial authorship across legislative stages) means that we had to select our 
sub-sample from a random sample of Bills and not a random sample of amendments per se. Consequently, the 
sub-sample analysis checks reliability for all amendments of the Bills that were randomly selected. In total six 
bills (with a total of 933 amendments) were selected for the reliability tests. 
ix
 Cohen’s Kappa (k) provides an index of agreement between coders that controls for the impact of agreements 
by chance. Kappa assumes nominal-level data and a k value of +1 indicates perfect agreement, zero chance 
agreement, and a negative k (up to –1) indicates less than chance agreement (Cramer, 1998: p.384). The formula 
for k is: (observed proportion of agreement – proportion of agreement expected by chance)/1 - proportion of 
agreement expected by chance. However, k is calculated in this paper via the crosstabs procedure in SPSS. In 
interpreting Kappa (k), Banerjee et al. propose the following standards: a value of +0.75 to 1.0 indicates 
excellent agreement beyond chance; +0.40 to +0.75, fair to good agreement beyond chance; and below +0.40, 
poor agreement beyond chance (Banerjee et al., 1999 quoted in Neuendorf 2002, p.143). Other interpretations of 
k in the literature are broadly similar (see Landis and Koch, 1977; and Monserud and Leemans, 1992 for 
example). 
x
 For a discussion of these, see Shephard and Cairney (forthcoming 2004). 
xi
 Substantive amendments are those amendments that at least extend the scope of the bill or alter its tone in at 
least one section. 
xii
 Either by the Executive or the committee itself (or both). While it may be in the interests of both actors to 
maintain a pretence around the significance of this issue, our analysis of the Official Reports does support this 
picture. 
xiii
 Indeed, if we remove Tommy Sheridan (SSP, 98 (84%) rejections) and Bill Aitken (Conservative, 128 (76%) 
rejections) then the rejection rate drops to 44% and withdrawal to 53%. 
xiv
 Although Tosh cannot take all of the credit – see Keating et al (forthcoming). 
xv
 Fiona McLeod, Scottish Parliament Official Report (29
th
 January 2003, col. 17540) 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S1/official_report/session-03/sor0129-02.htm 
xvi
 However, for a different view on these proceedings from a Whitehall perspective, see Page (2003). 
